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CPAs WHO PERFORM MANAGEMENT CONSULTING
SERVICES MAY FACE INCREASED EXPOSURE TO
CONTROLLING PERSON LIABILITY UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
The Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)' and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act)2 each provide a cause of action against any person who
"controls" other persons liable under the federal securities laws. 3 Section
15 of the '33 Ac (section 15) provides a cause of action against any person
controlling direct violators of sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act, which are
provisions imposing liability for misrepresentations in registration statements
and prospectuses.5 Section 20(a) of the '34 Act6 (section 20(a)) provides a cause
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7Thbbb (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1982).
3. See infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (describing controlling person liability
provisions in § 15 of Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and § 20(a) of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act)); see also infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of
controlling person actions in federal courts).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982).
5. See id. Section 15 of the '33 Act provides:
[e]very person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more
other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any
person liable under sections [11] or [12] of this title, shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlled person had no knowledge
of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of facts by reason of which the
liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (codification of '33 Act § 11); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982)
(codification of '33 Act § 12). Section 11 of the '33 Act provides a cause of action to a
purchaser of a security when the registration statement supporting the security contains material
misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. Id. § 77k(a). The plaintiff in a section 11
action may sue, inter alia, every person who signed the false registration statement, directors
or partners in the issuer of the affected security, accountants, engineers, appraisers, or any
professional who has consensually been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, and every underwriter of the affected security. Id. at § 77k(a)(1)-(5).
The defendants that section 11 specifies are potential "controlled persons" for purposes of
section 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982).
Defendants in section 12 actions are also potential "controlled persons" for purposes
of section 15. 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982). See generally Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securi-
ties Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 VAsH.
& LEE L. REv. 1007, 1007-11 (1983) (summarizing elements of § 15 actions). Section 12 of
the '33 Act provides a cause of action to purchasers of securities who are harmed by material
misrepresentations or omissions in materials used to sell securities, particularly prospectuses.
15 U.S.C. § 771(1) & (2) (1982). Defendants in section 12 actions can be anyone who uses
false materials to sell sectfrities. Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982).
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of action against anyone who controls another persons directly liable under the
'34 Act or under any regulation adopted pursuant to the '34 Act.7 Many
accounting firms and individual certified public accountants (CPAs) audit
clients whose securities offerings are governed by the '33 and '34 Acts.8 In
the past, however, federal courts have dismissed plaintiffs' controlling person
claims against CPAs when the alleged controlling person liability was based on
direct securities law violations by the CPAs' clients. 9 In each case the
plaintiffs failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove that the CPA firms
controlled their clients for purposes of the controlling person provisions.10
Future plaintiffs who seek to impose controlling person liability on CPAs,
however, are likely to be more successful as a result of an increasingly
critical, public scrutiny of CPAs tending to show that CPAs are assuming more
controlling roles in client management. I" CPAs currently are performing more
and more management consulting services that many commentators believe
are tantamount to control of client management. 2 Moreover, Congress has
7. See id. Section 20(a) of the '34 Act provides:
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action.
Id.
8. See Gruenbaum, The SEC's Use of Rule 2(e) to Discipline Accountants and Other
Professionals, 56 NOTRE DMmE LAW. 820, 820-37 (1981) (noting large numbers of CPAs that
practice before SEC on behalf of clients who are subject to regulation by SEC and use of SEC
disciplinary rule 2(e) to police CPAs' SEC-related activities).
9. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.
1986) (upholding dismissal of § 20(a) claim that CPA firm, through counsel given on financial
projections, controlled client who directly violated '34 Act § 10(b) and SEC rule lOb-5); In re
Com. Oil/Tesoro Pet. Sec. Lit., 484 F. Supp. 253, 268-69 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (dismissing
§ 20(a) claim that CPA, through auditor-audit client relationship, controlled client who directly
violated '34 Act § 10(b) and SEC rule lOb-5). In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes &
Holt the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the plaintiff
failed to assert and prove any '33 Act section 11 or section 12 direct liability claims against
the CPA firm's client, which are prerequisites to imposing indirect liability on controlling
persons under section 15. Barker, 797 F.2d at 494. The Barker court, therefore, upheld
dismissal of the plaintiffs section 15 claim. Id.; see infra notes 15-38 and accompanying text
(discussing plaintiff's requirements in § 15 controlling person liability claim); cf. Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp 879, 891-95 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding CPA firm liable as
controlling person based on direct liability of CPA firm's employee).
10. Barker, 797 F.2d at 494; In Re Com. Oil, 484 F. Supp. at 269; see infra notes 44-
51 and accompanying text (discussing facts of In Re Com. Oil and court's rationale for
dismissing controlling person claim); infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (discussing facts
of Barker and court's rationale for upholding dismissal of controlling person claim).
11. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (explaining why future plaintiffs may
face easier task showing that CPAs controlled clients who directly violated securities laws).
12. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (discussing allegations by persons
within and outside accounting profession that CPA performance of certain consulting services
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set up a commission that is investigating, among other alleged abuses, whether
certain CPA consulting services are equivalent to control of audit client man-
agement and, therefore, violate the accounting profession's ethical rule man-
dating CPA independence from audit client management. 3 A material side
effect of the commentary and the congressional investigation may be that
federal courts will allow plaintiffs in controlling person actions to satisfy the
burden of proving control by showing that CPAs performed the consulting
services that the commentators, and possibly the congressional commission,
consider to be client-controlling."1
To establish a prima facie case in a controlling person action, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant controlled another person who is directly
liable for a federal securities law violation. 5 Federal courts that have
is tantamount to control of client management); see also infra notes 112-20 and accompanying
text (discussing results of polls conducted from early-1970s through mid-1980s indicating that
commercial community believes particular consulting services have high likelihood of controlling
client decision making.
13. See News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 12-18 (reporting that congressional
investigation, under direction of Rep. John Dingell (Dingell Commission), would study, among
other issues, independence of CPAs from corporate clients). In 1976 and 1977 a Senate
commission, under the direction of Sen. Lee Metcalf (Metcalf Commission), scrutinized the
public accounting profession. Id. The Metcalf Commission urged the accounting profession to
undertake certain reform measures to increase the effectiveness of audits by CPAs of publicly
owned companies. Id. Rep. Dingell, under his authority as chairman of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, convened the current Commission for the purpose of studying
allegations that the accounting profession has failed to respond adequately to the recommen-
dations of the Metcalf Commission. Id.; see infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing
anticipated focus of Dingell Commission investigations on CPA consulting services alleged to
be tantamount to control of client management); infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (noting
that as of Spring 1987 Dingell Commission had not yet addressed independence issue, but that
Commission still considered independence to be significant issue warranting Commission scrutiny
in late-1987); see also AICPA PROFESSIONAL STADAnDs, vol. B (CCH) ET § 101.01 (June 1,
1985) (accounting profession's self-imposed ethical rule requiring CPAs to remain independent
from audit client management); infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing purpose
of independence rule to preserve imparitality of CPAs in auditing client's financial records).
14. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (listing consulting services that
commentators argue are tantamount to client control); see also infra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Dingell Commission is likely to agree with commentators);
infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (suggesting that federal courts in controlling person
actions may take judicial notice of Dingell Commission rulings).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982) (codification of § 15 of '33 Act). Under section 15 a
plaintiff must show that the defendant controlled, through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, a direct violator of certain other provisions of the '33 Act. Id. The defendant can
escape section 15 liability only if the defendant had no knowledge of, or no reason to know
of, the facts underlying the primary violation. Id. Similarly, under section 20(a) the plaintiff
must show that the defendant directly or indirectly controlled a direct violator of the '34 Act
or a violator of agency regulations pursuant to the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982) (codification
of § 20(a) of '34 Act). If the plaintiff proves that the defendant generally controlled the primary
violator, the defendant can escape liability only by proving that he acted in good faith and
did not induce the primary violation. Id. Accordingly, federal courts have held that both
section 15 and section 20(a) contain a plaintiff's prima facie burden of showing control and
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addressed both section 15 and section 20(a) claims have determined that the
concept of control is the same for both provisions.16 Federal courts disagree,
however, on what constitutes control for purposes of controlling person
liability. 7 Some United States Courts of Appeal have held that the plaintiff
must show only that the defendant controlled the operations of the primary
violator in general and was able to control the primary violation.' 8 Other
a defendant's affirmative defense burden of exculpation should the plaintiff satisfy the prima
facie burden. See, e.g., San Francisco-Oklahoma Petro. Explor. v. Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d 962,
964 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting, in § 15 action, plaintiff's prima facie burden of showing control
and holding that defendant's affirmative defense burden of exculpation is limited to single
statutory defense provided in §15); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 1985) (same);
G. A. Thompson & Co., Inc., v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting, in
§ 20(a) action, plaintiff's prima facie burden of showing control and holding that defendant's
affirmative defense burden of exculpation is limited to statutory defenses provided in § 20(a));
Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); see also infra
notes 17-38 and accompanying text (discussing split in United States Courts of Appeal over
proper standards of proof for plaintiff's prima facie burden in controlling person actions).
16. See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 389, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1979)
(disposing of § 15 and § 20(a) actions using same concept of "control" for both actions). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained in Carpenter that in enacting
section 20(a) of the '34 Act, Congress amended section 15 of the '33 Act to conform to the
same standard of control Congress was adopting in section 20(a). Id.; see Pharo v. Smith,
621 F.2d 656, 673 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogously intepreting concept of control in § 15 and
§ 20(a) claims); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
17. Compare Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that controlling
person action plaintiff must show only that defendant had ability to control primary violator),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 798 (1986); with Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-85 (3d
Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff must prove defendant culpably participated in primary
violation); see also infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text (discussing split in United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal over requirements of prima facie standard of control in controlling
person actions). See generally Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 5, at 1009-11 (discussing split in
United States Courts Appeal over ability to control standard versus actual control standard);
Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019, 1021-25 (same).
18. San Francisco-Oklahoma Petro. Explor. v. Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir.
1985); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 798
(1986); G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1981); see
infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of federal circuit courts of appeal
holding that plaintiff, to impose controlling person liability on defendant, must demonstrate
only that defendant had ability to control primary violation).
Commentators have argued that the ability to control standard imposes controlling person
liability based merely on a defendant's status relative to a controlled person and without a
showing that the defendant exercised actual control over the primary violator. See Ferrara &
Sanger, supra note 5, at 1010 (asserting that ability to control standard is purely status-based
standard of liability); Note, Liability of Corporate Directors As "Controlling Persons" Under
Section 20(a) Of The Securities Exchange Act, 28 DRAim L. REv. 437, 442-43 (1979) (same);
Note, supra note 17, at 1021-22 (refering to holdings of courts adopting ability to control
standard as "control-by-status position"). A control by status standard is consistent with and,
to that extent, supports the SEC's definition of control. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.405 (1986).
According to the SEC, control is the possession, direct or indirect, of power to direct or cause
direction of the management and policies of a primary violator, whether through ownership
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United States Courts of Appeal have required the plaintiffs to prove that
the defendant "culpably participated" in the primary violation. 9
In the recent case of Metge v. Baehler,20 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit joined the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in
adopting the ability to control standard, a standard that theoretically favors
plaintiffs. 2' In Metge a bank lent money to a corporate borrower who
subsequently committed a primary violation of securities law by making
material misrepresentations and nondisclosures in securities sales.2" The
plaintiff sued the bank under the section 15 controlling person provision,
arguing that the lender-borrower relationship established control for section
15 purposes.? In considering the district court's dismissal of the controlling
of stock, by contract, or otherwise. Id. But see Metge, 762 F.2d at 632. The Metge court held
that a plaintiff must show that the defendant actually exercised control over the general
operations of the primary violator. Id. The Metge court explained that the plaintiffs burden merely
does not include proving that the defendant exercised control over the transaction underlying
the primary violation. Id. at 630.
19. Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979); Rochez v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir.
1974); see Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1978). In Christoffel
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stopped just short of adopting the
culpable participation standard. Christoffel, 588 F.2d at 1085. The Christoffel court cited the
Second Circuit's decision in Gordon v. Burr and the Third Circuit's decision in Rochez Bros.
v. Rhoades for the proposition that a controlling person, to be liable, must have participated
in the primary violation. Id. The Christoffel court explained that because the defendant had
not participated in the primary violation, however, there was no need to determine whether
an element of culpability should become a part of the controlling person analysis in the Ninth
Circuit. Id.; see infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing Rochez Bros. opinion to
illustrate rationale underlying culpable participation standard).
20. 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 798 (1986).
21. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d at 630-31. The ability to control standard theoretically
favors plaintiffs because the standard does not require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant
actually controlled or participated in the transaction underlying the primary violation. Id. The
Melge court, however, demonstrated that the plaintiff-favorable nature of the ability to control
standard may be illusory. Id. The Metge court first adopted the ability to control standard
and then distinguished the Metge plaintiff's argument as proving only the defendant's "potential
for influenc[ing]" operations of the primary violator. Id. at 632. Explaining that a potential
for influencing operations does not satisfy the ability to control standard, the Metge court
upheld dismissal of the plaintiff's controlling person claim. Id.
In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits have adopted the
ability to control standard. Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d at 965 (Tenth Circuit); Partridge, 636 F.2d
at 957-58 (Fifth Circuit); see infra note 26 and accompanying text (noting Metge court's
citation of Fifth and Tenth Circuit opinions in support of Eighth Circuit's adoption of ability
to control standard).
22. Melge, 762 F.2d at 623-24, 630-32.
23. Id. at 623-24, 630-32. The plaintiff in Metge asserted that the typical lender-borrower
relationship provided a basis for controlling person liability when the borrower committed a
primary violation of the securities laws. Id. at 631. The plaintiff in Metge argued that the
defendant, Bankers Trust Company (BTC), controlled the primary violator, Investor's Equity,
Inc. (IEI), because BTC was IEI's primary lender and had the ability to foreclose on the basis
of delinquent payments. Id. The plaintiff further argued in support of control that BTC owned
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person claim, the Eighth Circuit in Metge explained that to prove control,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant generally controlled the operations
of the primarily liable person and that the defendant was able to control
the primary violation.2 The Metge court held that the plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant actually controlled the primary violation.2 The
Metge court explained that the plain meaning of the language of the
controlling person provisions supports the ability to control standard.26 The
approximately eighteen percent of IEI's stock, that BTC influenced IEI's relationship with an
important subsidiary of IEI, that BTC's security agreement with IEI gave BTC power over
IEI's capital stock policies, and that BTC personnel attended IEI board meetings. Id.
24. Id. at 631.
25. Id.
26. Id. In explaining its "plain meaning" rationale, the Metge court noted that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades expressly
adopted the more demanding "culpable participation" standard, under which the plaintiff
must show that the defendant culpably participated in the primary violation. Metge, 762 F.2d
at 631 (citing Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975)); see infra notes
31-38 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's adoption of culpable participation
standard in Rochez Bros.). Rejecting the culpable participation standard of Rochez Bros., the
Metge court pointed out that the absence of culpable participation is part of the affirmative
defense statutorily provided in the controlling person provisions. Metge, 762 F.2d at 631; see
supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (providing text of § 15 and § 20(a) including statutory
affirmative defenses). Thus, the Merge court argued, the Third Circuit's requirement that the
plaintiff must prove the defendant culpably participated in the primary violation shifts part of
the defendant's affirmative defense burden to the plaintiff-a shift that is contrary to the terms
of the statute. Merge, 762 F.2d at 631. The Metge court argued that once the plaintiff proves
control, the plain meaning of the controlling person provision in section 15 of the '33 Act
transfers the burden to the defendant to exculpate himself on the basis of the statutory defense.
Id.
To further support adoption of the ability to control test, the Merge court cited the
adoption of the ability to control standard by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 631 (citing G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945,
957-58 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Fifth Circuit in Partridge also asserted that the plain meaning of
the controlling person provisions does not require culpable participation in the primary
violation. Partridge, 636 F.2d at 957-58.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit adopted a control standard that does not require the
plaintiff to show the defendant participated in the primary violation. Richardson v, MacArthur,
451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971). In Richardson the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that because of section 20(a)'s remedial purpose, courts should construe sec-
tion 20(a) liberally. Id. at 41. The Richardson court further commented that courts should inter-
pret section 20(a) as requiring only indirect influence over the controlled person and not actual
control. Id. In support of the proposition that section 20(a) requires only indirect control
and no actual participation, the Richardson court cited the Eighth Circuit's 1967 opinion in
Myzel v. Fields. Id. at 41-42 (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)). The Eighth Circuit in Mege cited the same passage from Myzel
with approval. Metge, 762 F.2d at 630 (citing Myzel, 386 F.2d at 718). To the Metge court,
the Myzel passage advocating liberal construction of section 20(a) and requiring only indirect
influence supported the Merge court's adoption of the ability to control standard. Id. at 630-
31. The Tenth Circuit in Richardson, therefore, apparently accepted the ability to control
standard of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Richardson, 451 F.2d at 41-42; accord San Francisco-
Oklahoma Petro. Explor. v. Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding in § 15
1084
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Metge court held that the defendants' lender-borrower relationship, however,
indicated only the potential for influence over some of the primary violator's
business decisions. 27 The Metge court determined that the lender-borrower
relationship was not evidence of general control by the lender over the
borrower's overall operations as required under the ability to control stand-
ard. 28 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit in Metge upheld the district court's
dismissal of the controlling person action. 29
Three other United States Courts of Appeals, the Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits, have held that the plaintiff must show further that the
defendant "culpably participated" in the primary violation 0 The Third
Circuit's decision in Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades,3' exemplifies the
decisions in which federal courts have adopted the culpable participation
standard. 2 In Rochez Brothers the plaintiff claimed that a corporation
action that plaintiffs showing of defendant's authority and power to control, even in absence
of exercise of control, is sufficient to satisfy prima facie burden). In Carstan Oil the Tenth
Circuit again cited the Eight Circuit opinion in Myzel for the proposition that controlling
person liability attaches to the defendant even if he did not participate in the primary violation.
Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d at 965.
27. Metge, 762 F.2d at 631-32.
28. Id. at 632.
29. Id.
30. Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979); Rochez v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir.
1974); see infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing Rochez Bros. opinion to
illustrate rationale underlying culpable participation standard).
31. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
32. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 883-85, 890-91; see Gordon, 506 F.2d at 1085 (Second
Circuit's adoption of culpable participation standard); infra note 36 and accompanying text
(noting that Ninth Circuit has adopted "participation in primary violation" standard for
controlling person liability without adopting element of "culpability").
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has questioned, how-
ever, whether the culpable participation standard is still the law in the Third Circuit. Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 893 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The Sharp court upheld jury
findings that an accounting firm was liable as a section 20(a) controlling person with respect
to primary violations committed by an employee of the firm. Id. at 891-95. The Sharp court
noted that since Rochez Bros., the Third Circuit had held that section 20(a) on its face makes
the mere existence of a controlling person-controlled person relationship sufficient to establish
the plaintiffs prima facie case of liability. Id. (citing Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976)). The Sharp court pointed out that the Gould court, however,
did not overrule Rochez Bros. and instead cited Rochez Bros. with approval. Sharp, 457 F.
Supp. at 879. The Sharp court stated that it believed the ability to control, or relationship
control, standard of Gould governed the Third Circuit. Id.
The Sharp court explained, however, that it had misgivings in recognizing Gould as controlling
and proceeded to show that controlling person liability existed in Sharp even under the more restric-
tive culpable participation standard of Rochez Bros. Id. at 893-95. Further evidence that the culpable
participation standard is still part of controlling law in the Third Circuit is the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion in Merge v. Baehler that Rochez Bros. still governs the Third Circuit. See Metge
v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging Rochez Bros. as governing law
in Third Circuit without mentioning Third Circuit's opinion in Gould).
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controlled its president with respect to the president's primary violation of
SEC rule lOb-5 3  The United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania found that the Rochez Brothers plaintiff presented no
evidence indicating that the corporation controlled its president.3 4 On appeal,
the Third Circuit in Rochez Brothers explained that a plaintiff's proof of
the defendant's ability to control the primary violator does not constitute
a prima facie case for controlling person liability without further proof that
the defendant culpably participated in the primary violation. 35 The Rochez
Brothers court cited United States Senate and House reports from 1934 that
the court believed were indicative of a congressional intent to limit con-
trolling person liability to persons who culpably participated in the primary
violation. 36 The Rochez Brothers court found that Congress did not intend
33. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 883-85.
34. Id. at 884 (reviewing Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 390 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1974)).
35. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 884-85.
36. Id. at 885. (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in
J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLAT vE HISTORY OF Tim SECuRiTrs ACT OF 1933 AND
SEcugrrms EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, vol. 2, item no. 17 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, vol. 2, item no. 18; H.R.
REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1933), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR,
supra, vol. 2, item no. 19.) The Rochez Bros. court explained that the Senate and House
initially differed on the standard that should govern the concept of control. Id. The Rochez
Bros. court noted that the Senate version of the controlling person provision of the '34 Act
incorporated an "insurer's liability" standard. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1933), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHa, supra, vol. 2, item no. 17.) The Rochez
Bros. court explained that the Senate's insurer standard reflected an intent that controlling
person defendants should serve as insurers to the investing public against the wrongful actions
of primary violators, even when the controlling person did not participate in the violation.
Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885. The Rochez Bros. court noted that the House version of the
controlling person provision incorporated a "fiduciary standard." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, vol. 2,
item no. 18; H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER
& E. MAHAR, supra, vol. 2, item no. 19). The Rochez Bros. court reasoned that the fiduciary
standard reflected an intent to impose liability only on persons who, by culpably participating
in frauds carried out by controlled persons, breached a fiduciary duty of care that controlling
persons owe to investors. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885. The Rochez Bros. court further noted
that Congress ultimately adopted the House's fiduciary standard. Id.; see also Christoffel v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Congress' rejection of insurer
standard as grounds for adopting requirement of participation but not reaching question of whether
participation must have been "culpable").
The Rochez Bros. court also cited the 1967 Eighth Circuit opinion in Myzel v. Fields as
additional support for the culpable participation standard. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885
(citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)). But
see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth and Tenth Circuit's citation of
Myzel to support adoption of ability to control standard and rejection of Third Circuit's
adoption of culpable participation standard). In Myzel the Eighth Circuit ruled that a standard
more stringent than mere agency theory governed derivative liability for securities law violations.
Myzel, 386 F.2d at 738. The Rochez Bros. court believed that the Myzel court's rejection of
the agency concept of control supported the Rochez Bros. court's conclusion that a mere
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the controlling person provisions to operate as a source of insurance for
investors defrauded by primary violators.37 Finding that the plaintiff failed
to prove the defendant culpably participated in the primary violation, the
Third Circuit in Rochez Brothers affirmed the district court's judgment for
the defendant.
31
Neither the text of section 15 nor the text of section 20(a) indicates a
congressional intent to define control as culpable participation or mere
ability to control. 39 Commentators have asserted that Congress declined to
define control statutorily in section 15 and section 20(a).4 Courts and
relationship in which one party was able to control another is insufficient to impose controlling
person liability without a further showing of culpable participation. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d
at 885.
37. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885; see supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' rejection of controlling person liability as source of investor insurance).
38. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 891; see Annotation, "Controlling Person" Liability
Under §20(a) of Securities Act of 1934, 38 A.L.R. Fed. 725, 730 (1976). One commentator has
argued that the United States Supreme Court in the 1976 case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
provided additional support for the culpable participation standard. Annotation, supra, at 730;
accord In re Com. Oil/Tesoro Pet. Sec. Lit., 484 F.Supp. 253, 269 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (arguing
that Hochfelder requires proof of scienter in controlling person action). In Hochfelder the
Supreme Court noted as a collateral matter that section 20(a) exculpates defendants who acted in
good faith and did not induce the primary violation. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 209 n. 28 (1976). According to the commentator, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder
believed that the section 20(a) statutory defense supported the Court's primary holding that
the '34 Act generally requires proof of scienter to support liability under the '34 Act.
Annotation, supra, at 730. The commentator asserted that the Hochfelder Court's reference
to section 20(a) casts doubt on the viev that controlling person liability exists in the absence
of culpable participation, or scienter, by the defendant. Id.
Nevertheless, three of the United States Court of Appeals that have ruled on controlling
person liability since the Supreme Court issued Hochfelder have not adopted the commentator's
view that Hochfelder requires scienter, or culpable participation, as an element of establishing
controlling person liability. San Francisco-Oklahoma Pet. Explor. v. Carstan Oil, 765 F.2d 962,
965 (10th Cir. 1985) (adopting ability to control standard); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,
630-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting culpable participation standard in favor of less demanding ability
to control standard); G.A. Thompson & Co., Inc. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir.
1981) (same). Further, adoption of the culpable participation standard effectively renders the
controlling person provisions unnecessary in light of the existence and requirements of common
law aiding and abetting liability. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F.Supp. 879, 892 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (discussing distinction between §20(a) statutory remedy and common law aiding and
abetting remedy and noting comparative benefit to plaintiffs in §20(a) action of not having to
prove all elements of aiding and abetting). The common law aiding and abetting standards require
plaintiffs to prove, inter alia, that the defendant knowingly participated in securities law
violations. Id. See generally Ferrara & Sangar, supra note 5, at 1007-15 & 1023 (comparing
controlling person statutory liability standards with more stringent standards for common law
aiding and abetting liability).
39. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (setting forth text of controlling person
provisions).
40. See Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 5, at 1009 (arguing that Congress declined to
define term "control" in statute to stimulate broad interpretations of control); L. Loss,
SacuRrrms REGuLATION 1808 (1961) (observing that absence of statutory definition of control
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commentators have argued that Congress wanted control to remain a flexible
concept to comport with the remedial purposes of the '33 and '34 Acts.41
Further, Congress did not make clear in section 15 or section 20(a) whether
controlling person liability should attach only to particular persons or
entities. 42 While stock brokerage firms, corporations, corporate officers and
directors, and shareholders are the typical defendants in controlling person
liability actions, some plaintiffs have named CPA firms as defendants.
43
in § 15 and § 20(a) provisions has stimulated varied judicial and regulatory interpretations of
control). Noting that the only congressional guidance on the definition of control exists in
legislative history from the House, two commentators cited a 1934 House Report which
explained that control should be interpreted to include both "actual" control and "legally
enforceable" control. Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 5, at 1009 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 36, vol.
5, item no. 18); Note, supra note 17, at 1023 (same). According to one of the commentators,
courts can reasonably interpret "actual and legally enforceable" control to embrace the ability
to control standard. Note, supra note 17, at 1023. The commentator noted that in H.R. REP.
No. 1383, however, the House referred to a 1931 United States Supreme Court opinion as the
basis for the concept of legally enforceable control. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), reprinted in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 36, vol. 5,
item no. 18, which indicates that Congress borrowed term "legally enforceable control" from
Handy & Harmon v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931)). The commentator argues that Burnet
indicates that legally enforceable control requires evidence of actual exercise of control and
not mere ability to control. Id. The commentator did not explain whether under Burnet the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant controlled the primary violator's general operations
or, instead, the actual primary violation. Id.
41. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (setting forth text of controlling person
provisions which contain no statutory definition of control); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,
630 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) reprinted in J.
ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 36, vol. 5, item no. 18, which asserted that strict
definition of control was "undesirable' because of difficulty or impossibility of anticipating
every way control can be exerted); Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 5, at 1009 (stating that to
keep concept of control flexible, Congress declined to define control statutorily); Note, supra
note 18, at 441 (same); see also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). In Myzel the Eighth Circuit argued that the '34 Act is remedial
and should be interpreted liberally. Myzel, 386 F.2d at 738. According to the Myzel court,
the concept of control requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had some means of
disciplining or influencing the controlled person, short of actual direction. Id. One commentator
noted that other federal courts interpreting control for section 20(a) purposes frequently quote
the passage from Myzel. Note, supra note 18, at 441. But see supra note 36 and accompanying
text (noting that United States Courts of Appeal have quoted the Myzel passage as support
for both ability to control standard and more demanding culpable participation standard).
42. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (setting forth text of controlling person
provisions).
43. See Annotation, supra note 38, at 726 & 750-73 (surveying § 20(a) cases in United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts). The Annotation's survey indicates
that defendants in section 20(a) cases typically are stock brokerage firms, corporations, officers
and directors, and shareholders. Id. In a few instances, however, plaintiffs have named
accounting firms as defendants in controlling person liability cases. See, e.g., Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff named CPA
firm defendant in controlling person action related to primary violation by CPA firm's client);
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In In re Com. Oil/Tesoro Pet. Sec. Lit." (In re Com. Oil), an investor
claimed that the accounting firm of Deloitte Haskins & Sells (D H & S)
controlled an audit client who violated section 10(b) of the '34 Act and
SEC rule 10b-5.4 D H & S' client allegedly violated section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 using financial records that D H & S audited.4' The plaintiff argued
that CPAs always control their audit client's use of audited financial records
for section 20(a) purposes.47 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas in In re Com. Oil explained, however, that the Fifth
Circuit's governing definition of control was "the power generally to direct
or cause the direction of [client] management and policies." The In re
Com. Oil court found that D H & S' alleged control over the audited
financial records of D H & S' audit client did not extend to general control
of the client.49 The In re Com. Oil court, accordingly, held that D H & S'
alleged control did not fall within the Fifth Circuit's definition of control
and dismissed the section 20(a) claim.50 The In re Com. Oil court further
noted that recognition of the plaintiff's theory of control would extend
tremendously the liability of CPAs under the federal securities laws.5'
The most recent attempt to hold a CPA firm liable as a controlling
person was Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt.s2 In Barker the
CPA firm of Taylor, Edenfield, Gilliam & Wiltshire (Taylor Edenfield)
reviewed drafts of financial projections that Taylor Edenfield's audit client
In re Com. Oi/Tesoro Pet. Sec. Lit., 484 F. Supp. 253, 269 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (same); Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 891-95 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (plaintiff named CPA firm
defendant in controlling person action related to primary violation by employee of CPA firm);
see also infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text (discussing disposition of controlling person
actions involving CPA firms as defendants).
44. 484 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
45. In re Com. Oil, 484 F. Supp. at 256, 268-69.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 269. The plaintiffs argued that the investing public's reliance on a CPA's
certification of financial statements gives the CPA control over the client's financial dis-
closures. Id. The In re Com. Oil plaintiff asserted, in effect, an ability to control standard
based solely on the status of the defendant relative to the primary violator. See supra note 18
and accompanying text (noting that commentators have termed ability to control standard
"control by status" standard and have argued that control by status standard is very broad
and potentially encompasses defendants not contemplated by congresses enacting securities
acts); supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing ability to control standard).
48. In re Com. Oil, 484 F. Supp. at 268-69.
49. Id.
50. Id. The district court in In re Com. Oil cited the Fifth Circuit in Drier v. Tarpon
Oil Co. which ruled that control means the possession of power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of the controlled person. Id. at 268 (citing Drier, 522 F.2d
199 (5th Cir. 1975)); see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing more recent Fifth
Circuit opinion affirming ability to control standard and distinguishing between ability to
control general management of primary violator and ability to control actual primary violation).
51. In re Com. Oil, 484 F. Supp. at 269.
52. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
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intended to include in materials used to sell bonds and promissory notes. s3
Taylor Edenfield suggested changes to the projections but did not audit or
verify the accuracy of the projections.5 4 During the period in which Taylor
Edenfield served as auditor to the client and reviewed the financial projection
drafts, the client violated section 10(b) of the '34 Act and SEC rule lOb-5
in its sales of the bonds and notes.5 5 Based on Taylor Edenfield's status as
auditor and on Taylor Edenfield's review of the financial projection drafts,
the Barker plaintiffs, purchasers of the bonds and notes, sought to hold
Taylor Edenfield liable as a controlling person under section 15 and section
20(a).56 Finding that the plaintiff alleged no primary violations of '33 Act
section 11 or 12, the district court in Barker dismissed the plaintiffs' claim
under section 15 against Taylor Edenfield which depended upon proof of a
section 11 or 12 violation by the audit client.57 The district court also
dismissed the section 20(a) claim tha Taylor Edenfield was a controlling
person in regards to the audit client's violation of '34 Act section 10(b) and
SEC rule 10(b)-5.
58
53. Barker v. Lee County Bank, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,404, at 92,479 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1985) (district court opinion in Barker v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt). The Seventh Circuit opinion in Barker adopted the district court's recita-
tion of the underlying facts. Barker, 797 F.2d at 492. In Barker the primary violator, Michigan
Baptist Foundation (MBF), sold bonds and promissory notes to finance the construction of a
retirement community. Barker, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH), at 92,478.
The Florida State Comptroller subsequently placed MBF in receivership, and the receivership
suspended principal and interest payments on the bonds and notes. Id. Plaintiffs, purchasers
of the bonds and notes, alleged that MBF violated section 10(b) and rule lob-5 through
advertisements and mail solicitations used to sell the bonds and notes. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 92,478; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing nature of primary
violations committed by Taylor Edenfield's audit client).
56. Barker, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 92,478. In addition
to naming Taylor Edenfield as controlling person defendants, the plaintiffs in Barker claimed
Taylor Edenfield directly violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. The plaintiffs also sought
to impose section 15 and section 20(a) liability on a law firm that had advised MBF on several
matters related to promotion and sales of the bonds and notes. Id. at 92,492-93.
57. Id. at 92,490; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (presenting text of § 15
which imposes controlling person liability only on defendant who controlled primary violator
of '33 Act §§ 11 or 12).
58. Barker, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), at 92,490. The district
court in Barker ruled that for purposes of section 20(a) liability, controlling persons must have
participated actively in the operations of the primary violator and actually must have controlled
the violative transaction. Id. Accordingly, the district court in Barker adopted a standard of
controlling person liability similar to the culpable participation standard of the Second, Third,
and Fourth Circuits. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (discussing culpable
participation standard of Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits). The district court held that the
plaintiffs offered no evidence to show that Taylor Edenfield had power to control the client
or even had participated in the client's management during the period in which the client
allegedly violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Barker, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH), at 92,490. The district court in Barker noted that no Taylor Edenfield
employee ever served as a permanent officer or director of the client and no Taylor Edenfield
employee ever attended a client board of directors meeting. Id. at 92,479; see infra note 60
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On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in Barker upheld the district court's dismissal of the section 15 claim against
Taylor Edenfield because the plaintiff alleged no underlying '33 Act section
11 or 12 violation. 9 In addressing the plaintiffs' section 20(a) claim, the
Seventh Circuit in Barker adopted a controlling person standard resembling
the ability to control standard of the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth CircuitsA
0
The Barker court mentioned no requirement that controlling persons, to be
liable under section 20(a), must have culpably participated in the primary
violation. 6' The Barker court stated that the ability to persuade and to
counsel clients on the general management of the client's operations, how-
ever, is not tantamount to section 20(a) control. 62 The Seventh Circuit
explained that, instead, control for section 20(a) purposes means the practical
ability to direct the actions of issuers and sellers of securities who commit
primary violations. 63 Finding that Taylor Edenfield counseled but did not
direct the actions of the primary violators, the Seventh Circuit in Barker
upheld the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' section 20(a) claim
against Taylor Edenfield 4
Although losing in Barker and In re Com. Oil, plaintiffs undoubtedly
will continue to sue CPAs and CPA firms under section 15 and section
20(a). In the future, however, plaintiffs may be more successful in proving
the elements of control, lacking in Barker and In re Corn. Oil, that are
necessary to impose controlling person liability on CPAs and CPA firms.6
CPAs increasingly provide a variety of management consulting services in
addition to traditional audit services. 66 Many commentators argue that
certain management consulting services are tantamount to general control,
and accompanying text (noting that Seventh Circuit in Barker, although upholding dismissal
of § 20(a) claim, adopted control standard closely resembling less demanding ability to control
standard); see also supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing ability to control
standard).
59. Barker, 797 F.2d at 494.
60. Id.; see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing ability to control
standard). The Seventh Circuit in Barker cited with approval the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
Melge v. Baehler that section 20(a) liability applies to persons who had merely the ability to
control the primary violator. Barker, 797 F.2d at 494 (citing Merge, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th
Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 798 (1986)); see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text
(discussing Metge court's adoption of ability to control standard).




65. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (arguing that plaintiff's proof that
CPA performed management controlling consulting services for clients may suffice to provide
elements of control lacking in earlier, unsuccessful controlling person claims against CPAs).
66. See P. MONTAGNA, CERTED PUBLIc AccOUrTING 143-45, 176-77 (1974) (noting
that CPAs counsel clients dn matters, inter alia, of mergers and acquisitions, general manage-
ment and administration, office management, personnel, sales, research and development, and
computer systems development).
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or direction, of client management.67 The commentators argue that CPA
performance of management controlling consulting services for audit clients
diminishes the impartiality of the CPA's judgment that is vital in inde-
pendent audits.68 Infringements on CPA impartiality towards audit clients
violate the public accounting profession's ethical rule requiring auditors to
be independent of audit clients. 69 An ongoing congressional commission
under the direction of Rep. John Dingell (Dingell Commission) is investi-
gating, inter alia, the allegations that certain management consulting services
violate auditor independence principles. 70 A major by-product of the public
analysis of the independence issue is an increasingly large body of docu-
mented thought concerning when a CPA or CPA firm so influentially
advises a client that the CPA or CPA firm controls the client's decision
making. 71 Published documentation of the independence issue will increase
when the Dingell Commission reports on its investigations.7 2 The documen-
tation could arm future plaintiffs with extremely persuasive arguments that
CPAs, by performing certain management consulting services, directed the
operations of clients for purposes of the '33 & '34 Acts' controlling person
provisions. 3
The Dingell Commission is investigating several alleged problem areas in
the accounting profession.1 4 Rep. Dingell has stated, however, that one of the
67. See S. ABR, AHAM, THE PuBLic ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
66-67 (1978) (criticizing CPA consulting services as promoting conflicts of interest when CPAs
effectively control management of audit clients); Corbett, The Key to the Public's Confidence:
High Quality CPA Work and Skillful PR Programs, J. Acct., August 1985, at 114 (noting
widespread criticism of CPA consulting services performed for audit clients); see also infra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing commentary criticizing CPA management
consulting services).
68. See S. ABRAHAM, supra note 67, at 66-67 (1978) (commenting on impact of CPA
consulting services on audit independence); Corbett, supra note 67, at 114 (same).
69. AICPA PRoFEssIoNAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) ET§ 101.01 (June 1, 1985) (ac-
counting profession's ethical rule on independence); see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying
text (discussing elements and ramifications of violation of independence rule).
70. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing focus and progress of Dingell
Commission to date).
71. See, e.g., 66 THE CPA LETTER, Nov. 26, 1986, at 1 (reporting results of study con-
ducted under auspices of AICPA indicating that certain CPA consulting services-termed Manage-
ment Advisory Services (MAS) by the accounting profession-performed for audit clients can
cause great impairment of independence); Titard, Independence and MAS-Opinions of Finan-
cial Statement Users, J. ACCT., July 1971, at 47, 52 (same); Briloff, Old Myths and New Realities
in Accountancy, 41 ACCT. Rnv. 484, 491 (1966) (results from survey indicated that over 50%
of financial statement users believed MAS impede auditor independence); see also infra notes
112-20 and accompanying text (discussing results of surveys and noting that certain MAS have
large potential for causing independence problems).
72. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that Dingell Commission already
has initiated legislative proposals, accompanied by committee reports, to increase effectiveness
of independent auditors' ability to detect fraud in client operations).
73. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussion potential for federal courts
to accept ultimate conclusions of Dingell Commission as persausive evidence in plaintiffs'
prima facie cases imposing controlling person liability on CPAs).
74. See News Report, J. AcCT., April 1985, at 12, 18. The New Report stated that
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Commission's top priorities will be an inquiry into the accounting profes-
sion's ability to enforce the profession's own ethical rule on auditor inde-
pendence. 7 The accounting profession, like the legal profession, has imposed
upon itself a set of ethical regulations. 76 The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), the accounting profession's counterpart to
the American Bar Association, promulgates the ethical standards and en-
forces CPA compliance with the standards.7 7 The AICPA and state ac-
counting societies together "certify" accountants for public practice by
administering a nationally uniform CPA examination.7 8 Furthermore, the
Dingell Commission investigations would study, among other issues, the relationship of CPA
opinions and corporate failures, the ability of CPAs to give public advance warning on failing
banks and companies, and CPA responses to reform recommendations made by the Metcalf
Senate Committee in 1977. Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing investigation
of accounting profession by Metcalf Senate Committee in 1976-77). In 1985 and 1986 the Dingell
Commission primarily focused on fraud detection through enhanced auditing procedures. See
Washington Update, J. AcCT., August 1986, at 56 (reporting that Dingell Commission through
June 1986 had concentrated on proposed legislation to increase auditor responsibilities in
detecting fraud and illegal activity perpetrated by audit clients). In late 1987, however, the
Dingell Commission intends to investigate thoroughly the issue of auditor independence.
Telephone Interview with staff assistant to Rep. John Dingell (Feb. 19, 1987).
75. See News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 18 (announcing opening of Dingell
Commission investigation and Commission's proposed areas of study).
76. Compare AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) ET§§ 50-591 (June 1,
1985) (explaining nationally uniform applicability of accounting profession code of ethics, text
of rules of ethics, and AICPA "interpretations" of certain factual scenarios that potentially
give rise to ethics violations); with MODEL RuL..ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Canons 1-7 (1983)
(American Bar Association's guidelines for ethical attorney conduct available for adoption and
modification by state bar associations); see also infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text
(discussing operation of AICPA Ethics Code rule governing CPA independence from audit
clients). The AICPA code of ethics governs CPA conduct primarily in matters of independence,
competence, responsibility to clients and colleagues, advertising and solicitation, and forms of
practice. AICPA PROFESSIONAL SrANDARDs, vol. B (CCH) ET§§ 50-591 (June 1, 1985).
77. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) BL §§ 101.01, 360.01 & 701-
70 (June 1, 1985) (Bylaws of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
declaring authority of AICPA to make and enforce rules of conduct governing accounting
profession); see also id. at ET § 51.06 (stating that AICPA's ethical rules of conduct are
mandatory and enforceable). Two-thirds of AICPA's membership must vote in favor of a new
ethical rule or an amendment to an existing rule to promulgate a change to the ethics code.
Id. at BL § 840.01. Proposals for changes or amendments may be made by any 30 members
of the AICPA's governing Council, by the AICPA Board of Governors, by the AICPA
Professional Ethics Division, by 200 members at large, or by petition of five percent of the
entire AICPA membership. Id. at BL § 820.01.
CPAs become certified for public practice under the auspices of the AICPA and after
completing a nationally uniform CPA examination. Id. at BL § 220.01. Accordingly, AICPA
ethical standards govern CPAs' practices so long as CPAs practice under the auspices of
AICPA certification.
78. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) BL § 220.01 (June 1, 1985)
(discussing requirement that accounting students complete CPA examination before receiving
AICPA certification to practice as CPA); see F. NVINDAL & R. CoRLEY, THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSIONAL: ETmcs, RESPONSIBILITY Am LIABILITY 9 (1980) (explaining that state boards of
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AICPA possesses the right to impose sanctions on CPAs who fail to comply
with established practice standards, particularly ethical standards. 9 AICPA
sanctions include public censure and suspension or termination of AICPA
membership. 0
The first rule in the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics (Ethics
Code), rule 101, is the client independence rule." Noncompliance with the
independence rule exposes CPAs to AICPA disciplinary action and poten-
tially heightens CPA exposure to controlling person liability. s2 The inde-
pendence rule forbids a CPA or CPA firm to render opinions on the
financial statements of a client unless the CPA or CPA firm maintains an
independent relationship with the client."3 The independent nature of CPA
accountancy participate in administering AICPA's nationally uniform exam). A few states add
sections to the exam on subject matters of particular interest in the particular state. F. WINDAL.
& R. Coiuay, supra, at 9. In many states, a further step in a CPA's certification process is
satisfactory completion of an Ethics Examination also administered by the AICPA. See
PROFESSIONAL ETcs FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (1982) (self-study reading materials
and accompanying examination made available to students who have passed AICPA's national
examination). The Ethics Examination contains an extensive section on auditor independence
as mandated by the AICPA Code of Ethics. Id. at 35-110. See generally Anderson, CPA
Requirements of the States, in THE ACCoUNTING S wLER 65-67 (T. Burns & H. Hendrickson
eds. 1976) (describing variations in states' requirements for certification and licensing of CPAs).
79. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANmARDS, Vol. B (CCH) BL §§ 701-70 (June 1, 1985)
(describing system for disciplining CPAs who violate AICPA practice standards); see also infra
note 80 and accompanying text (noting that AICPA sanctions for ethics code violations include
public censure and suspension or termination of AICPA membership).
80. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Vol. B (CCH) BL §§ 730-40 (June 1, 1985).
81. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Vol. B (CCH) EL § 101.01 (June 1, 1985)
(codification of AICPA ethical rule on auditor-client independence).
82. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing one prong of independence
rule which proscribes, for ethical reasons, CPA control of client management); see also infra
notes 93-127 and accompanying text (discussing potential for importation of scholarly com-
mentary on independence rule into plaintiffs' arguments that CPAs are controlling persons for
securities law purposes).
83. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) ET § 101.01 (June 1, 1985).
Financial statements are periodic reporis, primarily balance sheets and income statements,
produced by every profit and nonprofit enterprise that disclose the financial situation of the
enterprise. See L. McCUULERS & R. VAN DANIKER, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING,
Financial Statements: An Overview 20-47 (1975) (defining financial statements and generally
describing components and use of financial statements). The CPA, as auditor, reviews enterprise
financial statements and renders an opinion that the statements either do or do not comform
with "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP). See M. PELOUBET, THE FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVE AND Tim NEw ACCOUNTING 65-98 (1967) (defining and generally describing audits
of financial statements); F. WNDAL & R. CoRLEY, supra note 78, at 58 (same); see also
AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Vol. B (CCH) ET§ 52.01 (June 1, 1985) (explaining that
independence rule exists because CPA's role in reviewing and giving opinions on financial
statements requires impartial and objective judgment). GAAP refers to general rules adopted
by the accounting profession as guidelines for the general practice of accounting. M. PELOUBET,
supra, at 374-75. The accounting profession considers GAAP rules to be "settled" bases of con-
duct and practice. Id. The source of GAAP, however, is somewhat nebulous. Id. Among the rules
that are considered a part of GAAP are promulgations of the Financial Accounting Standards
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relationships with audit clients fulfills the business community's desire for
impartial verification of the accuracy of the reported financial results of
commercial enterprises.8 4 Any significant infringement on the impartiality
of an auditor defeats the basic purpose of the independent audit. 85
The drafters of the AICPA's Ethics Code structured the independence
rule to address two different circumstances that impair CPA independence
6
Ethics Code rule 101-A prohibits a CPA from auditing any client in which
the CPA has a financial interest.8 7 Ethics Code rule 101-B prohibits a CPA
from assisting any audit client's officers and directors to such an extent
that the CPA becomes a de facto manager or director of the client. 8 Rule
101-B further prohibits the CPA from performing so much of the actual
financial accounting work of the client that the CPA audits his own work
when later performing the audit.Y9 In the only official interpretation of rule
101-B with respect to consulting services, which are referred to as manage-
ment advisory services (MAS) in the accounting profession, the AICPA stated
that CPAs and CPA firms performing MAS for audit clients must not assume the
roles of employee or manager in audit client operations. 9 The AICPA interpreta-
tion of rule 101-B states, additionally, that CPAs and CPA firms shall not con-
summate transactions, hold custody of assets, or otherwise exercise authority on
behalf of audit clients.9 1 In another statement covering general guidelines for
MAS practice, the AICPA commented further that MAS practitioners must
Board (FASB), the Accounting Principles Board (APB), the American Accounting Association,
and the SEC. Id. The FASB and the APB, unlike the SEC, are professional groups within
the accounting profession whose rulings govern CPAs through leverage exerted by the AICPA
and by courts willing to incorporate GAAP into tort duties of care. Id. Common business
practices in particular industries and writings of accountants and academicians in professional
journals also form a part of GAAP. Id.
84. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARmS, vol. B (CCH) ET § 52.01 (June 1, 1985). Investors
in profit-making enterprises and lenders to both profit and nonprofit enterprises are among
the primary users of audited financial statements. See M. PELoUBET, supra note 83, at 10-15
(identifying principal users of financial statements and users' interests in financial statement
information). Most users of audited financial statements depend on the statements in deter-
mining whether to begin or continue a financial relationship with the audited enterprise. Id.
Because users risk financial resources in beginning or continuing relationships with the audited
enterprise, users desire the utmost possible accuracy in audited statements. Id.
85. See AICPA PRoFEssIONAL STANDARDS, vol. B (CCH) ET § 52.01 (June 1, 1985)
(noting vital importance of impartial auditor judgment in independent audits).
86. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing two distinct proscriptions in
auditor independence rule).
87. AICPA PRO'ESSIONAL STANDARDs, vol. B (CCH) ET § 101.01(A) (June 1, 1985).
88. Id. at ET § 101.01(B).
89. Id.
90. Id. at ET § 101.04(3) (Ethical Rule No. 101, interpretation 101-3). See generally M.
PELOUBET, supra note 83, at 17-49 (defining management advisory services (MAS) and describing
various types of CPA MAS). Generally, MAS is CPA nonaudit, consulting assistance that is
concerned primarily with increasing a client's profitability or, in the case of a nonprofit
enterprise, the client's efficiency. Id.
91. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANaADS, VOL. B (CCH) ET § 101.04(3) (June 1, 1985).
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minimize the possibility that MAS clients might conclude that MAS practitioners
have assumed client decision-making responsibility. 92
Recently, members of academia and members of the accounting profes-
sion have criticized expansion of CPA MAS practices by alleging that the
AICPA is failing materially to enforce auditor-client independence when
CPAs perform MAS for their audit clients. 93. The criticism of MAS prac-
tices, combined with the heightened public scrutiny of general audit quality,
prompted the current congressional investigation by the Dingell Commission.94
The heightened scrutiny of audit quality results from a dramatic increase in the
last two decades of audit failures. 95 An audit failure occurs when an
enterprise fails very shortly after receiving an unqualified, or favorable,
audit opinion from the enterprise's outside auditor. 96 While focusing pri-
92. MAS CONSULTATIONS, Statement on Standards for Management Advisory Services
No. 3, § 12 (AICPA 1982). Statement No. 3, however, offers no examples of what activities
CPA-MAS practitioners should avoid to prevent clients from concluding that the CPA has assumed
client decision-making responsibility. Id.
93. See, e.g., S. ABRAHAM, supra note 67, at 66-67 (asserting that as long as AICPA
allows auditors to perform MAS for audit client, AICPA is promoting conflicts of interest
contrary to auditor independence rule). Abraham argues that CPA firms are earning rapidly
increasing proportion of fees from MAS activities performed for audit clients. Id. Abraham bluntly
states that to avoid promoting conflicts of interest, the accounting profession should forbid
independent auditors from performing consulting services for audit clients. Id.; F. WINDAL
& R. CORLEY, supra note 78, at 164 (quoting representative of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
who asserted that public has subjected few other professions to scrutiny of degree that
accounting profession has faced with respect to issue of independence problems arising from
MAS services and AICPA failure to assert ethical barriers to MAS); Corbett, supra note 67,
at 114 (noting that not since 1977 congressional hearings involving accounting profession have
CPAs been focus of extreme critical attention with respect to MAS impairment of independence
among other problem areas); Corbett, supra note 67, at 118 (admonishing CPAs to enhance
increasingly weak public image by educating public on meaning of audit independence with
respect to impairment of independence by MAS activities).
94. See News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 12 (reporting that in February 1985
Rep. Dingell, chairman of House Energy and Commerce Committee, prompted by wide public
criticism of accounting profession, convened first of series of hearings into effectiveness of
independent accountants who audit publicly owned companies).
95. See Corbett, supra note 67, at 114 (asserting that recent heightened scrutiny of
CPAs' auditing and non-auditing services is result of well publicized audit failures including
Penn Square Bank and Drysdale Government Securities). Penn Square Bank failed as a result
of holding an overwhelming number of uncollectible, outstanding loans. Scheibla, Penn Square
Leaves Legacy of Litigation, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 20, 1982, at 4, col. 3. Despite
the worthless loan accounts, Penn Square's auditors delivered a favorable opinion on Penn
Square's financial statements only months before Penn Square went into bankruptcy. Id.
96. See Corbertt, supra note 67, at 114 (defining audit failure and discussion three widely
publicized audit failures of early 1980s); see also AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, vol. A
(CCH) § 101.01 (June 1, 1985) (unqualified audit opinion must state that CPA rendering
opinion believes client enterprise is "going concern"). See generally Statements in Quotes, J.
AccT., Sept. 1985, at 154-56 (quoting George Bernstein, executive partner of nationwide
accounting firm Laventhol & Horwath, discussing accounting profession's view on causes
of audit failures). Addressing the California Society of CPAs, Bernstein asserted that pressure
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marily on quality controls over auditing procedures, congressional studies
in the 1970s also focused to some extent on auditor independence." In 1985
and 1986 The Dingell Commission, in studying audit failures, focused primarily
on fraud detection through enhanced auditing procedures.9" In late 1987 or
early 1988, however, the Dingell Commission intends to investigate the issue
of auditor independence thoroughly. 9
The attention given by the Dingell Commission and by the commentators
to the independence issue results from an increasingly common perception
that accountants have strayed too far from the traditional audit function
in their relationships with audit clients.2° Accounting firms have observed
that performing MAS for audit clients has demonstrated far more profit
potential than mere continuation of audit relationships.10' Independence
problems arise when management "advice" from CPAs or CPA firms
from both government and private bodies would "coerce" the profession into educating
outsiders on the uses and limitations of audits "so that they understand that so-called audit
failures are almost always business failures." Id.
97. Compare STAF OF SENATE Comm. ON GOVERNMENTAL ArAms, 95TH CONG., IST SESS.,
IMPROVING THE ACCOUNTABrrY OF PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR AuDiTORs
15-17 (Comm. Print 1977) (observations of Metcalf Senate Committee of mid-1970s which
studied ability of accounting profession to police itself with respect to quality control over
auditing engagements); with News Reports, J. AcCT., August 1985, at 18 (reporting anticipated
focus of mid-1980s Dingell Commission inquiry into accounting profession). The Metcalf
Committee addressed independence problems arising from performance of nonaudit services
as a passing issue. Staff of Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra, at 15-17. The
Dingell Commission, however, has stated that independence deficiencies arising from non-audit
services is one of the Dingell Commission's primary concerns. News Reports, supra at 18. But
But see M. STEVENS, THE BIG EIGHT 199 (1981). Steven's commentary on the practices of the
nations eight largest accounting firms asserts that the "brunt" of the Metcalf Committee's
"attack" was leveled at the impairment of CPA independence resulting from MAS activities.
Id. According to Stevens, the Metcalf Committee did not conclude that CPAs control audit
clients through MAS work. Id. Instead, Stevens noted, the Metcalf Committee concluded that
CPAs subjugate themselves to clients on audit matters in return for commitments from clients
to hire CPAs to perform MAS, since MAS holds far more profit potential than auditing. Id.
Stevens reports that the Metcalf Committee report scoffed at the "Big Eight" firms for
continuing to call themselves independent accounting firms. Id.
98. See Washington Update, J. ACCT., August 1986, at 56 (reporting that Dingell Commis-
sion through June 1986 had concentrated on proposed legislation to increase auditor respon-
sibilities in detecting fraud and illegal activity perpetrated by audit clients).
99. Telephone interview with staff assistant to Rep. John Dingell (Feb. 19, 1987).
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing perception that non-audit services
previously detract from independent status of CPAs).
101. See Statements In Quotes, J. AccT., September 1985, at 154 (quoting George L.
Bernstein, executive partner of international accounting firm Laventhol & Horwath). Bernstein
commented that a recent study of the top 20 United States CPA firms indicated that audit
fees at those firms average approximately 60 percent of total fees for those firms and that
before 1990 the percentage may drop to 50 percent. Id. Bernstein further noted that most
firms believe that the best source of new fees is the field of MAS. Id.; see How The Public
Sees CPAs, J. AccT., Dec. 1986, at 31 (noting rapid expansion of CPA firms into nonaudit
services).
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ceases to be mere advice and becomes management per se. 10 2 In defense of
its continued emphasis on MAS practice development, the accounting profes-
sion has contended that many MAS services are natural by-products of
audit skills and have the potential to impact audit quality favorably.
10 3
Members of the accounting profession further maintain that the profes-
sion's self-policing function is capable of preventing significant MAS-related
independence problems.'"" CPAs frequently assert that no empirical evidence
102. See P. MONTAGNA, supra note 66, at 152. Comments made by MAS specialists from
"Big Eight" accounting firms illustrate the client control problem. See id. (quoting a number
of Big Eight MAS consultants speaking on the issue of CPA-client independence). According
to the MAS consultants, clients never say explicitly, "Please tell us what to do." The consultants
believe, however, that clients universally do exactly what consultants advise without questioning
the consultants' advise. id. The consultants explained that in most cases the try to refrain from
being direct in their answers to avoid making actual decisions for the clients. Id. According
to one consultant, clients must "run their own house. One client of mine wants me to do the
whole job, that is, his internal administration. They don't question our [conclusions]." Id. The
same commentary noted that the smaller the client, the more likely the conclusion of the CPA-
consultant would become, in effect, the decision of the client. Id. The consultants asserted
that, although some CPAs enjoy making decisions for clients, making decisions for clients is
poor consulting. Id.
103. See F. WINDAL & R. CoRLaY, supra note 78, at 164-65 (quoting representative of
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., "Big Eight" accounting firm, who presented typical list of
accounting profession's defenses of MAS services). The Peat, Marwick representative asserted
that MAS practice is an integral part of the accounting profession; that MAS capabilities are
increasingly important in enhancing audit quality; that there are demonstrable advantages to
clients in obtaining MAS from their CPAs; and, that examinations of the impact of MAS
activities on auditors' independence have produced no empirical evidence of compromises of
CPA independence. Id.; see How The Public Sees CPAs, supra note 101, at 31 (results of
public opinion poll indicating that public believes CPAs are better management consultants
than staff of nonCPA management consulting firms); Corbett, supra note 67, at 118 (arguing
that MAS is important source of assistance to American businesses and that CPAs are especially
qualified as management consultants).
104. See News Report, J. AcCT., April 1985, at 12 (noting that basis of self-policing
function system in accounting profession is process of peer review in which CPAs, or CPA firms,
periodically check and report on work of other CPAs and CPA firms; see also S. LoEB,
ETncs ni THE ACcOUNTING PROFEssioN 297 (1978) (surveying numerous comments by mem-
bers of accounting profession in defense of accounting profession's ability to avoid MAS-
related independence problems). But see News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 12. The
AICPA's own News Report quotes Rep. Dingell asserting that under the peer review system
accountants rarely criticize other accountants' practices.; see also Anderson & Ellyson, Restruc-
turing Professional Standards: The Anderson Report, J. AcCT., Sept. 1986, at 92. In 1986, in
response to heightened criticism of the accounting profession's ability to police itself, the
AICPA appointed a subcommittee (Anderson Committee) to make a pervasive study of AICPA
professional standards. Anderson & Ellyson, supra, AT 92. Among the Anderson Committee's
proposals is a recommendation to "restructure" the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics
into two interrelated sections. Id. at 94. One of the sections contains new "standards of
professional conduct." Id. The other section covers new "rules of performance and be-
havior." Id. According to Anderson Committee's report, the new rules of performance and
behavior define acceptable behavior, proscribe unacceptable behavior, and identify sources of
authority for enforcing standards. Id. Concerning independence, however, neither the proposed
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exists of actual situations in which CPA performance of MAS violated audit
independence. 5
bne possible outcome of the Dingell Commission's investigation of
MAS, however, is a proposal for legislation forbidding CPAs to perform cer-
tain MAS for their audit clients. 1 6 Conceivably, CPAs would be permitted to
continue rendering these same consulting services for non-audit clients. 0 7 Conse-
quently, anticipated Dingell Commission conclusions disapproving certain
MAS practices could carry over into controlling person actions against
CPAs when non-audit, MAS clients commit primary violations of the
securities laws. 08
Some of the existing commentary on the independence issue may influ-
ence the Dingell Commission's investigations and conclusions. °9 Part of this
commentary has focused on specific CPA MAS services and has indicated
that particular services have high or low probabilities of Ethics Code rule
101-B independence problems."0 Despite the accounting industry's traditionally
defensive position on the impact of MAS services on auditor independence,
the AICPA typically reports to its membership the findings of these critical
analyses even when the results cast suspicion on certain CPA MAS practices." I'
"standard" of independence nor the proposed "rule" on independence adds substantive enforce-
ment procedures to the platitude-laden, existing standard on independence. Id. at 96-98; see supra
notes 86-92 and accompanying text (describing existing AICPA independence rule). The
proposed standard on independence would preclude relationships that may "appear to impair
a [CPA's] objectivity" in performing audits. Anderson & Ellyson, supra, at 96. The standard
further requires the CPA-auditor to be "independent in fact and appearance." Id. The proposed
rule on independence simply provides that CPAs must be "independent in the performance of
professional services as required by standards promulgated by [designates of the AICPA]."
Id. at 98; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that AICPA has issued only one,
very general interpretation of independence rule impact on MAS).
105. See S. LOEB, ETcs ni TH AccouNTiN PROESSION 297 (1978) (quoting several
members of accounting profession asserting absence of empirical evidence on MAS impairment
of auditor independence).
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that Dingell Commission already
has initiated legislation that would mandate greater CPA responsibility for detecting fraud in
clients' operations).
107. See News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 12-18 (noting that focus of Dingell
Commission investigation is limited solely to effectiveness of CPAs in independently auditing
publicly owned companies).
108. Cf. notes 43-64 and accompanying text (indicating that past, unsuccessful controlling
person actions against CPAs involved audit client relationships).
109. See News Report, J. AccT., April 1985, at 14 (noting testimony at Dingell
Commission hearings by prominent academicians who criticized CPA MAS practices as creating
material independence problems).
110. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text (citing surveys of various parties'
perceptions on impact of MAS on audit independence and identifying certain MAS practices
as having large potential for independence impairment).
111. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (discussing survey results, reported
in AICPA publications, that identified particular CPA MAS practices with high likelihood of
causing independence problems).
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One example of findings disapproving certain CPA MAS practices is a
1971 survey indicating that members of the business community perceived
that MAS impairment of independence varies by type of MAS service.1
2
According to the survey's respondents, independence is impaired most
significantly when CPAs assist audit clients in mergers and business acqui-
sitions, executive recruitment, and policy determinations.' Results of a
1986 survey indicate that the commercial community still perceives the potential
for impairment of independence in some of the same MAS services indicated
in the 1971 study." 4 Overall, however, the MAS services studied in the 1986
survey more accurately reflect the composition of MAS services currently
offered by CPAs than the MAS reviewed in the 1971 survey."' At least
half of the 1986 survey respondents perceived "great" or "some" impair-
ment of independence when CPAs help audit clients identify merger and
acquisition candidates, negotiate combinations and divestitures, and perform
actuarial services directly affecting balance sheet accounts. " 6 The 1986 survey
additionally indicated that impairment results when CPAs help audit clients
perform strategic planning, renegotiate or redetermine prices under procure-
ment contracts, value assets obtained in business combinations, perform ex-
ecutive searches, and develop executive compensation plans." '7
In addition, a 1986 Harris Public Opinion poll, commissioned by the AICPA
to gauge public opinion concerning various aspects of the accounting profes-
sion, provides further evidence that certain MAS practices impair client
independence." 8 The Harris agency questioned members of the American
public and special target groups on their perceptions of CPA honesty,
112. See Titard, supra note 71, at 47, 52 (reporting results of 1971 survey of business
community's beliefs on MAS and auditor independence).
113. Id. According to the survey, auditor independence is impaired least when CPAs
help audit clients forecast sales and decide plant location, plant layout, distribution channels,
and forms design. Id. The study further indicated that installation, improvement, and review
of client accounting systems fell in the middle of the spectrum of perceived independence impair-
ment. Id.
114. See 66 TnE CPA LETTER, Nov. 26, 1986, at I (reporting results of 1986 survey of
business community's beliefs on MAS impairment of auditor independence); see also infra
notes 116-17 and accompanying text (noting that 1986 survey, like 1971 survey, identified CPA
assistance to clients in mergers and acquisitions and in executive searches as having high
likelihood of causing independence problems).
115. 66 THE CPA LETER, Nov. 26, 1986, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Id. The survey's respondents perceived no potential or little potential for impairment
of independence when CPAs help audit clients perform site location studies and market
feasibility studies, design or install computer systems, design control systems for managing
long-term contracts, perform actuarial services involving clients' pension plans, and design or
install cash management systems. Id.
118. See How The Public Sees CPAs, supra note 101, at 16-34 (reporting results of
Harris Public Opinion Poll of public's perception of accounting profession); see also infra
notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing findings of Harris Public Opinion Poll). The
AICPA published the results of the poll in The Journal of Accountancy, an AICPA monthly




competence, reliability, objectivity, creativity, and concern for the public
interest." 9 The portion of the poll covering independence impairment re-
sulting from MAS services included a conclusion that asset appraisal services
and executive searches are likely to impair auditor independence.
2 0
The Dingell Commission may reach similar conclusions that particular
MAS activities create overly controlling roles by CPAs in client manage-
ment. 12' If the federal courts in section 15 and 20(a) controlling person ac-
tions are willing to import the arguments of existing commentary or the
ultimate conclusions of the Dingell Commission, plaintiffs will face an
easy task in establishing prima facie cases of control against CPAs who
performed management-controlling MAS for clients who directly violated
federal securities law.' In the federal judicial circuits that have adopted the
ability to control standard, plaintiffs seeking to hold CPAs liable as con-
trolling persons would easily satisfy the prima facie requirement of proving
control by showing that the CPA-defendants performed management-con-
trolling MAS for primary violators.'2 3 Even in the federal judicial circuits
that have adopted the culpable participation standard, plaintiffs who can show
that a CPA performed management-controlling MAS for a primary violator
will have a foundation for proving further that the CPA culpably participated
in the primary violation. 24 The result could be a significant extension of
CPA liability under federal securities law. Federal courts must be careful,
however, to avoid imposing liability beyond the extent intended when
Congress rejected the insurer's standard in enacting the controlling person
119. Id. at 16, 19. The special target groups in the AICPA-Harris poll included owners,
directors, and executives of businesses, bank lending officers, attorneys, government officials,
including aides to members of Congress, academics, media personnel, and securities analysts.
Id. at 20.
120. Id. at 28. The AICPA-Harris poll indicated that five areas of MAS practice are
"fitting and proper" for auditors to undertake with audit clients. Id. According to the poll,
no independence problems are likely when CPAs perform general management consulting
services; act as service bureaus for various record-keeping functions; help audit clients select
and design computer hardware and software; conduct educational programs; and perform ac-
tuarial services. Id.
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that Dingell Commission probably
will rely heavily on existing commentary and empirical data indicating that CPAs control audit
clients and, therefore, violate independence rule by performing particular types of MAS for
audit clients).
122. See supra notes 15-38 (discussing plaintiff's prima facie burdens in § 15 and § 20(a)
controlling person actions).
123. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text (discussing ability to control standard
and noting which United States Courts of Appeal have adopted ability to control standard).
Under the ability to control standard, plaintiffs need prove only that the allegedly controlling
person possessed the ability to control the general management or operations of the primary
violator. Id.
124. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (discussing culpable participation
standard and noting which United States Courts of Appeal have adopted culpable participation
standard). Under the culpable participation standard, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant
possessed the ability to control general activities of the primary violator and that the
defendant actually participated in the primary violation. Id.
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provisions. 25 Unthoughtful importation into controlling person law of Din-
gell Commission conclusions, or conclusions of professional commentary,
might effectuate loose constructions of the prima facie requirement in
controlling person actions.126 The result would be an adoption of the insurer's
standard that Congress rejected.' 27
JAMs K. VINS
125. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' rejection of
insurer standard, and adoption of fiduciary standard, in adopting controlling person provisions).
126. See supra notes 15-38 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs' prima facie
burden in controlling person liability action and disagreement among federal judicial circuits
as to components of prima facie burden).
127. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' rejection of
insurer standard in adopting controlling person provisions),
1102
